Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147317
Authors: 
Burret, Heiko T.
Feld, Lars P.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6063
Abstract: 
The paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules' coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules at the cantonal level have a negative effect on public deficits, which is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes are rather not associated with substantial evasive measures. Third, cantonal fiscal rules tend to mitigate political budget cycles and shock-related deficits.
Subjects: 
Switzerland
fiscal rule
debt brake
budget cycle
election
fiscal shock
JEL: 
H72
H74
H77
D72
K39
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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