Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147309
Authors: 
Möllers, Claudia
Stühmeier, Torben
Wenzel, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 233
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally studies the role of search cost in duopoly markets where sellers may be able to coordinate pricing decisions. We vary the level of search cost and whether sellers can communicate. While we find that consumers are more likely to invest in search when cost is reduced, we find that a reduction of search cost does not influence prices. This effect is not influenced by the availability of seller communication. Our results suggest that policy interventions that aim to increase the competitiveness of markets via reducing search cost may not be effective in concentrated markets.
Subjects: 
Search
Collusion
Regulation
JEL: 
K23
L13
L51
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-232-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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