Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147199
Authors: 
Ikazaki, Daisuke
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economic Structures [ISSN:] 2193-2409 [Volume:] 3 [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 1-13
Abstract: 
In this paper, we present a simple overlapping-generations model with human capital, pollution, and political corruption to consider problems related to sustainable growth. In many growth models that incorporate the environment, it is assumed that there exists an altruistic government that enforces the environmental policy to maximize the utility of households or social welfare. The conditions for sustainable growth are derived based on this assumption. However, the assumption that the government implements appropriate policies might be overly optimistic. Bribes, political donations, and corruption might taint and skew government policy. This paper also considers politico-economic problems.We assume that environmental policy is determined endogenously through a process of bargaining between the government and the firm (or interest group). Corruption relaxes environmental standards, lowers the long-run growth rate, and might cause economic stagnation. The long-run growth rate might become negative if the economy is rife with corruption.
Subjects: 
Political corruption
Sustainable growth
Human capital
Environment
JEL: 
O44
P48
Q20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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