Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147146 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper Series No. 549
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze global data about electricity generation and document that the risk exposure of a firm's owners and its workers depends on competitors' ability or willingness to change their output in response to productivity shocks. Competitor inflexibility appears to be a risk factor: the sales of firms with more inflexible competitors respond more strongly to aggregate sales shocks. As a consequence, competitor inflexibility also affects the stability of firms' total wage- and dividend-payments. Firms with relatively flexible competitors appear to smoothen both wages and dividends, but an increase in competitor inflexibility is associated with less dividend-smoothing and more wagesmoothing. Our evidence supports the idea that labor productivity risk associated with competitor inflexibility should be borne by firms' shareholders, rather than by their workers.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.01 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.