Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147145 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper Series No. 548
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perception about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perception are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.
Schlagwörter: 
Closed-end fund
Closed-end fund discount
Managerial rent
JEL: 
G23
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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