Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146964
Authors: 
Schipper, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 15-1
Abstract: 
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be "evolutionary stable" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. The impossibility result remains intact when restricted to the classes of generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements or 2x2 games, in which learning is known to be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizable outcomes, iterated admissible outcomes, or minimal curb sets. A possibility result restricted to "strategically trivial" games fails if some generic games outside this class are considered as well.
Subjects: 
learning in games
learning heuristics
learning rules
interactive learning
uncoupled learning
meta-learning
Nash equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
rationalizability
iterated admissibility
minimal curb sets
dominance solvable games
common interest games
reputation
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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