Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146923 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper Series No. 542
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Data show that sovereign risk reduces liquidity, increases funding cost and risk of banks highly exposed to it. I build a model that rationalizes this fact. Banks act as delegated monitors and invest in risky projects and in risky sovereign bonds. As investors hear rumors of increased sovereign risk, they run the bank (via global games). Banks could rollover liquidity in repo market using government bonds as collateral, but as sovereign risk raises collateral values shrink. Overall banks' liquidity falls (its cost increases) and so does banks' credit. In this context noisy news (announcements with signal extraction) of consolidation policies are recessionary in the short run, as they contribute to investors and banks pessimism, and mildly expansionary in the medium run. The banks liquidity channel plays a major role in the fiscal transmission.
Schlagwörter: 
liquidity risk
sovereign risk
banks' funding costs
JEL: 
E5
G3
E6
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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