Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146718 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 41 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía [Place:] Santiago de Chile [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 89-123
Verlag: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Zusammenfassung: 
We study through framed field economic experiment the effects of exogenous changes in abundance levels of a renewable natural resource on compliance individual decisions of users operating under a common property regime and a system of Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) considering extraction quotas and external enforcement to detect and sanctions violations. Our results indicate that in the presence of resource abundance, fishermen decrease the level of abstraction when they face a quota external control vis-à-vis a common property regime, while in a situation of resources scarcity observed also a reduction in extraction levels; however, in this case fishermen have levels of non compliance and extractions higher than in the scenario of resource abundance, even with extractions above the Nash equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
economics experiments
compliance
abundance
territorial user rights
JEL: 
Q48
H23
Q53
H31
Dokumentart: 
Article

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