Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146718
Authors: 
Santis, Óscar
Chávez, Carlos
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 41 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 89-123
Abstract: 
We study through framed field economic experiment the effects of exogenous changes in abundance levels of a renewable natural resource on compliance individual decisions of users operating under a common property regime and a system of Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) considering extraction quotas and external enforcement to detect and sanctions violations. Our results indicate that in the presence of resource abundance, fishermen decrease the level of abstraction when they face a quota external control vis-à-vis a common property regime, while in a situation of resources scarcity observed also a reduction in extraction levels; however, in this case fishermen have levels of non compliance and extractions higher than in the scenario of resource abundance, even with extractions above the Nash equilibrium.
Subjects: 
economics experiments
compliance
abundance
territorial user rights
JEL: 
Q48
H23
Q53
H31
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
187.28 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.