Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146639
Authors: 
de Haas, Samuel
Paha, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 32-2016
Abstract: 
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Subjects: 
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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