Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146517
Authors: 
Breyel, Corinna
Grigoriadis, Theocharis
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, School of Business & Economics: Economics 2016/18
Abstract: 
Resource-rich dictatorships are more inclined to repress civil society than others. In this paper, we identify a tradeoff between political rents from natural resources and the organizational density of civil society. This organizational density determines the extent to which citizens can threaten the dictator with a revolution. We find that, in the occurrence of a negative oil price shock, regime change becomes likely, whereas a positive oil shock increases the extractive capacity of the dictator. When a negative oil price shock occurs, the persecution of failed revolutionaries can prevent revolution if the probability of revolutionary success is already low ex-ante. Historical and contemporary illustrations are drawn from Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Egypt.
Subjects: 
natural resources
dictatorship
civil society
organizational density
persecution
JEL: 
C73
P36
P48
P51
Q34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
590.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.