Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146488
Authors: 
Albornoz, Facundo
Berlinski, Samuel G.
Cabrales, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-708
Abstract: 
This paper studies a model where student effort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. It can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way, by incorporating the behavioral responses of parents, teachers and policymakers, the paper provides a rationale for the existing ambiguous empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. The paper also provides a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications for welfare and different education policies.
Subjects: 
Education
Incentives
School resources
Parental involvement
School sorting
Peer effects
JEL: 
I20
I21
I28
J24
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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