Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146285 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2016/91
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Some claim that certain forms of social protection, conditional cash transfers in particular, result in perverse incentives for recipients in order to stay eligible for receiving benefits. This notion has a bearing on the design of social protection programmes and may undermine the political support for these programmes. This paper analyses Ecuador's conditional cash transfer programme, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano. The key finding is that concerns about perverse incentives appear largely misplaced. By examining broader patterns of institutionalization of occupational gender segregation, the role of cash transfers is found to be trivial to the deepening of informality and inactivity among recipients.
Schlagwörter: 
cash transfers
informality
employment
segregation
Ecuador
JEL: 
J16
I38
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-134-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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