Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145885
Authors: 
Schüwer, Ulrich
Gropp, Reint
Noth, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Empirical Market Studies B02-V3
Abstract: 
Why do some banks react to deregulation by expanding geographically while others do not? This paper examines this question using exogenous variation in locally non-diversifiable risk that banks face in their home state. As a measure of locally non-diversifiable risk we use data on damages arising from natural disasters in the U.S. Combining this data with information on the staggered deregulation in the 90s, we find that banks facing such risks expand significantly more into other states after deregulation than banks that do not face such risks. Only large banks are able to take advantage of deregulation, small banks are not. Finally, banks that do expand, do not necessarily seek to reduce their exposure to risk when expanding.
JEL: 
G21
G28
G20
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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