Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145881
Autoren: 
Chlaß, Nadine
Perea, Andrés
Datum: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Economic Theory and Personality No. A04-V2
Zusammenfassung: 
Do individuals choose how to a solve a dynamic game or is their mode of reasoning a type-like predisposition? We show experimentally that an individual’s propensity to forwardly or backwardly induct is a function of (i) her belief whether an opponent’s previous action was a trembling hand mistake or a rational choice, and (ii) her personality. In a two-stage game, the individual observes an action of a computerized opponent (stage 1) before both interact (stage 2). The opponent chooses rationally most of the time and makes random choices with a small commonly known likelihood. Hence, the opponent’s action in stage 1 discloses with some probability the opponent’s type (choice) in stage 2. The individual can either believe that (i) the opponent chose randomly in stage 1, or that (ii) the opponent made a rational choice. An individual rationally responds to this belief if she solves stage 2 by backwards induction in the first, and by forward induction in the second case.
JEL: 
C73
C91
D82
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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