Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145849
Authors: 
Fugger, Nicolas
Rasch, Alexander
Zeppenfeld, Christopher
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Auctions and Prices D02-V2
Abstract: 
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under standard preferences. We investigate whether the empirical breakdown of this equivalence is due to (non-standard) preferences or due to the different complexity of the two formats, i.e., a different level of mathematical or individual sophistication. First, we elicit measures of individual preferences and secondly manipulate the degree of complexity by offering various levels of decision support. Our results show that the equivalence of the two auction formats only breaks down in the absence of decision support. This indicates that the empirical breakdown is caused by differing complexity between the two formats rather than non-standard preferences.
JEL: 
D44
D81
D47
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.