Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145794
Authors: 
Kusterer, David
Bolton, Gary
Mans, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Experimental Economics: Cheating C05-V1
Abstract: 
Reputation systems associated with Internet markets are known to be subject to strategic manipulation. The experiment we present suggests that this manipulation can extend to factors that have heretofore been overlooked: the leniency and moral wiggle room that arise from uncertainty about the source of transaction problems. Uncertainty about seller culpability leads to behaviors that reduce the informativeness of the feedback system, thereby diminishing the incentives for honest seller behavior. Under uncertainty, buyers pay about the same prices but get significantly less.
JEL: 
C90
D47
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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