Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145646
Authors: 
Jahnke, Björn
Fochmann, Martin
Wagener, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Public Goods B10-V2
Abstract: 
Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that "the system" had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that only learned that the attempt did not aect their payoffs or that were not at all exposed to corruption.
JEL: 
H41
A13
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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