Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145644
Authors: 
Szech, Nora
Huck, Steffen
Wenner, Lukas
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Behavioral Economics E04-V3
Abstract: 
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice — and perform stunningly well. Agents who are uninformed regarding their piece rate tend to outperform all others, even those who know that their piece rate is high. This also holds for enforced instead of self-selected information avoidance. All our findings can be captured by a model of optimally distorted expectations following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005).
JEL: 
D83
D84
J31
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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