Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145634
Authors: 
Eisenkopf, Gerald
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Experimental Economics: Social Preferences D05-V3
Abstract: 
The paper studies an experimental conflict in a repeated game and tests the robustness of communication as an intermediate conflict resolution instrument. The results show a strong and persistent impact of communication. Most conflict parties refrain from conflict expenditures even after the opportunity for communication has expired. Third party involvement with punishment options do not enhance this effect while the indivisibility of the contest prize reduces it. The initial intensity of the conflict has a small but long-term negative impact on conflict resolution.
JEL: 
C92
F51
D74
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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