Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145627
Authors: 
Götz, Georg
Brühn, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Collusion and Exclusionary Practices in Oligopoly E02-V3
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes exclusionary conduct of platforms in two-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases against shopping centers introducing radius restrictions on their tenants, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard two-sided market model, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent shopping center to introduce exclusivity clauses when faced by entry of a rival shopping center. We show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the two shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.
JEL: 
D43
D62
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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