Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145489
Authors: 
Fels, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Behavioral Economics E04-V1
Abstract: 
Consumers frequently overinsure modest risks. I argue that confining consumers' insurance motives to a single motive - risk aversion - is responsible for the difficulty to rationalize this behavior. People who perform mental accounting have an additional motive for buying insurance. They perceive a risk of having insufficient means to self-insure. This complements behavioral approaches to explain the profitability of warranties and the dislike of deductibles. It accounts for several empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile within existing models. Finally, it suggests that the way in which an insurer pays benefits influences the value and the cost of insurance.
JEL: 
D11
D14
D81
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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