Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145474
Authors: 
Hoffmann, Timo
Renes, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Bargaining and Participation Constraints B04-V2
Abstract: 
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions.
JEL: 
C91
D70
D82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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