Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145434
Authors: 
Kamishiro, Yusuke
Serrano, Roberto
Wooders, Myrna
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2015-11
Abstract: 
In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. When the number of agents with private information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information. The result goes through when all agents are informationally small.
Subjects: 
Large Quasilinear Economies
Approximate Cores
Small Group Effectiveness
Asymmetric Information
JEL: 
C71
C72
D51
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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