Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145432 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2015-9
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another's behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that behavioral or social preference motivations may solve this conundrum. In a laboratory experiment in which subjects lack any private material incentive to report partners' actions, we find that most cooperators incur a cost to report a defecting partner when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner.
Schlagwörter: 
reputation
prisoners' dilemma
experiment
punishment
communication
costly reporting
social preference
inequity aversion
JEL: 
C91
D03
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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