Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145343
Authors: 
Cai, Xiaoming
Gautier, Pieter
Wolthoff, Ronald
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 16-036/VI
Abstract: 
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call "joint concavity." Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
Subjects: 
search frictions
matching function
meeting technology
competing mechanisms
heterogeneity
JEL: 
C78
D44
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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