Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145289
Authors: 
Fehrler, Sebastian
Przepiorka, Wojtek
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9998
Abstract: 
People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.
Subjects: 
costly signaling
social preferences
trust
trustworthiness
partner choice
corporate social responsibility
electoral competition
JEL: 
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.