Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145285 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9994
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Do ruling parties positively discriminate in favour of their own constituencies in allocating public resources? If they do, do they gain electorally in engaging in such a practice? This paper tests whether partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in the state of West Bengal in India, and whether incumbent local governments (village councils) gain electorally in the practice of partisan alignment. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we find that the village council level ruling-party spends significantly more in its own party constituencies as compared to opponent constituencies. We also find strong evidence of electoral rewards in the practice of partisan alignment. However, we find that the results differ between the two main ruling political parties at the village council level in the state.
Schlagwörter: 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
partisan alignment feedback effect
fuzzy regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
H53
I38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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