Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145042 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6007
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise control over legislative vote outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Several pieces of evidence indicate that this control seems to be, at least partly, driven by campaign finance donations. Moreover, control seems to be most prevalent in times of higher electoral competition, i.e. during election years. Our contribution sheds new light on the role of money in politics and, more generally, opens a novel perspective to empirical research on legislative voting.
Schlagwörter: 
forensic economics
campaign finance
special interest groups
lobbying
JEL: 
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.