Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144993
Authors: 
Blume, Andreas
Kriss, Peter H.
Weber, Roberto A.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5958
Abstract: 
We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Govindan and Wilson (2009)), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.
Subjects: 
coordination
communication
forward induction
experiment
stag hunt
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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