Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144948 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5913
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Using an intertemporal model of saving and capital accumulation with two types of agents (workers and capitalists) we demonstrate that it is impossible for any binding minimum wage to increase the after-tax incomes of workers if the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, or if there are no differences in ability among workers. We also show that it is not possible to increase the incomes of employed workers through minimum wage legislation, even under decreasing returns to scale and heterogeneity of ability among workers, unless the welfare support provided to unemployed workers is far below what they would earn in the absence of minimum wages. Moreover, we establish that in the absence of a separate class of agents (i.e. capitalists) minimum wages cannot increase the incomes of employed workers even when there are decreasing returns to scale and no welfare support is provided to the unemployed.
Schlagwörter: 
minimum wage
capital accumulation
heterogeneity
unemployment
JEL: 
E21
E24
E64
H23
J23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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