Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144909
Authors: 
Le Quement, Mark T.
Marcin, Isabel
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016/5
Abstract: 
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only consistent with the third model. Roughly 80% of (heuristic) subjects truth-tell and vote with the majority of announced signals. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule.
Subjects: 
committees
voting
information aggregation
cheap talk
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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