Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144908
Authors: 
Bierbrauer, Felix
Netzer, Nick
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016/4
Abstract: 
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social choice functions are implementable. We show how these results extend to a two-dimensional mechanism design setting where the agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of intentionality.
Subjects: 
mechanism design
psychological games
social preferences
reciprocity
JEL: 
C70
C72
D02
D03
D82
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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