Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144704 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2016/6
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
Mandatory pension systems only partially replace old-age income, therefore the government also operates a voluntary pension system, where savings are matched by government grants. Accounting for the resulting tax expenditure, our models describe the income flow from shortsighted to farsighted workers. 1. In rational models, explicit results are obtained, showing the limited learning of shortsighted workers. 2. In agent-based models, this learning is improved and this raises the shortsighted workers' saving and reduces perverse income redistribution.
Schlagwörter: 
life-cycle savings
overlapping generations
mandatory pensions
voluntary pensions
agent-based models
JEL: 
H55
D91
ISBN: 
978-615-5594-35-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
637.76 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.