Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144694 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2015/53
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
There is an asymmetry regarding what previous decisions depositors may observe when choosing whether to withdraw or keep the money deposited: it is more likely that withdrawals are observed. We study how decision-making changes if depositors are able to make their decision to keep their funds in the bank visible to subsequent depositors at a cost. We show theoretically in a Diamond-Dybvig setup that without this signaling option multiple equilibria are possible, while signaling makes the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We find that indeed when signaling is available, bank runs are less likely to arise and signaling is extensively used.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank runs
Asymmetric information
Experimental evidence
Signaling
JEL: 
C72
C91
D80
G21
ISBN: 
978-615-5594-20-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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