Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144188
Authors: 
Seldeslachts, Jo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] DIW Economic Bulletin [ISSN:] 2192-7219 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 26/27 [Pages:] 295-299
Abstract: 
In this study, we analyze a client's choice of contract in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for cases. The distinguishing feature is that lawyers may submit bids with any fee arrangement they wish. We find robust evidence that bids offering hourly rates are less attractive to clients. Our findings tentatively contradict lawyers' often-made argument that hourly rates are in a client's best interest.
Subjects: 
lawyers' fee arrangements
clients' choices
discrete choice models
JEL: 
C25
D43
K10
K40
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
108.83 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.