Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142735
Authors: 
Caleiro, António
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Documento de Trabalho 2005/04
Abstract: 
This note presents some of the consequences due to the possibility of having early elections. First of all, elections, whether exogenously or endogenously determined, are relevant to challenge the well known neutrality principle of economic policies under rational expectations. Furthermore, in the particular case of being possible to admit early elections, the electoral advantages of right-wing parties in relation to left-wing parties suffer a diminishment.
Subjects: 
Early Elections
Median Voter
Partisan Policies
JEL: 
D72
E52
E61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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