Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142733
Authors: 
Flynn, Niall
Kah, Christopher
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2015-16
Abstract: 
In an experiment we first elicit the distributional preferences of subjects and then let them bid for a lottery, either in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism or a Vickrey auction (VA). Standard theory predicts that altruistic subjects underbid in the VA - compared to the BDM - while spiteful subjects overbid in the VA. The data do not confirm those predictions. While we observe aggregate underbidding in the VA, the result is not driven by the choices of altruistic subjects.
Subjects: 
Distributional preferences
BDM
Vickrey auction
JEL: 
C91
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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