Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142642
Authors: 
Yamamura, Eiji
Kondoh, Haruo
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 13/2012
Abstract: 
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
Subjects: 
Information disclosure
Special interest group
Construction expenditure
Rent seeking
JEL: 
D73
D78
H79
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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