Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142633
Authors: 
Ahmed, Sharmina
Findlay, Christopher
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 04/2012
Abstract: 
Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of risk-sharing and moral hazard is far from settled. Moreover, existing empirical study very often plague by selection problem. We address both issues using data from rural Bangladesh. This paper tested a model empirically where the leasing decision and contract choice are simultaneous. A modified Heckman model is estimated which avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts. Empirical tests reject the hypothesis of pure risk sharing and a wide range of support for the presence of moral hazard problem in the choice of contracts.
Subjects: 
Contract choice
Heckman model
Moral hazard
Risk
Sharecropping
JEL: 
Q15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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