Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142611
Authors: 
Martins, Ana Paula
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 04/2011
Abstract: 
This research extends simple two-sector models in order to inquire the impact of the extent of coverage or enforcement of minimum wage legislation in one of the sectors on the equilibrium outcome. Two versions of institutional wage avoidance are presented. They may be seen as representing different institutional detection rules: one working through worker complaint, the other through firm sampling inspection (and enforcement) by the legal system. Both cases are modelled as enlargements of two dualistic models: Harris-Todaro (the wage in the other sector is market determined) and Bhagwati-Hamada (the wage in the other sector is institutionally fixed and coverage is complete). Impact on population flows of changes in degree of coverage (compliance) is also confronted with the effect of a change in the institutional wage for each scenario.
Subjects: 
Migration
Mobility
Minimum Wages
Segmented Labor Markets
Informal Sector
Regional Labor Markets
Dualistic Models
Coverage
JEL: 
O15
O17
O18
R23
J38
J42
J61
J62
F22
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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