Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142557
Authors: 
Tasnádi, Attila
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 25/2009
Abstract: 
We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
Subjects: 
Forchheimer
Dominant firm
Price leadership
JEL: 
D43
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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