Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142490
Authors: 
Greene, William H.
Martins, Ana P.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 08/2002
Abstract: 
The present paper develops a simple asymmetrical informational model that allows us to understand the individualĀ“s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor and enforce hours and offer different workweeks to the two types of workers a previous part-time/full-time wage schedules separating equilibrium was presented. In the other, only one work-week schedule can be offered.
Subjects: 
Strikes
asymmetric information
signaling
labor contracts
part-time work
mean or grouped data and limited dependent variables
binary choice models with mean or grouped data
sample selection with mean data
JEL: 
J52
J41
D82
C24
C25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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