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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EERI Research Paper Series No. 06/2002
Verlag: 
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper discusses the sensitivity of the labor market outcome in the standard bargaining paradigms - monopoly union and efficient bargaining - to the existence of a budget constraint pending on the financing of the unemployment benefit. Consequences of how the unions value members and members' status (employed or unemployed) in their collective maximand, implications of union having control over membership, and, hence, of unemployment insurance coverage, are also considered, as well as of different fiscal scenarios on the form of financing the unemployment benefit bill.
Schlagwörter: 
Unions
Wage Determination Models
Unemployment Benefit
Unemployment Insurance
Union Wage Bargaining
Union Membership
JEL: 
J51
J65
E24
H55
H39
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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