Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142406 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9967
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a novel justification for a declining time profile of unemployment benefits that does not rely on moral hazard or consumption-smoothing considerations. We consider a simple search environment with homogeneous workers and low- and high-productivity firms. By introducing a declining time profile of benefits, the government can affect the equilibrium wage profile in a manner that enhances the sorting of workers across low- and high-productivity firms. We demonstrate that optimal government policy depends on the dispersion and skewness of the firms' productivity distribution.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment benefit policy
declining unemployment benefits
productivity distribution
skewness
dispersion
JEL: 
J64
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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