Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142385
Autoren: 
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Robbett, Andrea
Akbar, Prottoy
Datum: 
2016
Reihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9946
Zusammenfassung: 
Despite the "1/N problem" associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally-minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture and we discuss the results of an experiment that confirms that profit sharing is most effective when peer reporting is possible.
Schlagwörter: 
team production
profit sharing
peer reporting
reciprocity
experiment
JEL: 
C92
J30
D20
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
690.54 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.