Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142181
Authors: 
Benndorf, Volker
Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 222
Abstract: 
Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in common one- and two-population models. We also design a continuous-time experiment, exploring the dynamics and the equilibrium selection. The data largely confirm the theory.
Subjects: 
evolutionary game theory
experiment in continuous time
hawk-dove game
replicator dynamics
JEL: 
C62
C73
C91
C92
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-221-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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