Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142009 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSIO Working Paper No. 0135
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweightloss.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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