Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141833
Authors: 
Vesperoni, Alberto
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5856
Abstract: 
During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
Subjects: 
war
conflict
contest
democracy
franchise extension
JEL: 
D72
D74
F51
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.