Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141584 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9825
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.
Schlagwörter: 
absenteeism
gatekeeping
competition
role-conflicts
JEL: 
H55
I11
I18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
293.55 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.